Abstract: Goldman's notions of expert and testimony in epistemological contexts are extended to normative issues. The result is a sketch of a conceptual framework: several types of experts and roles they can serve in informing not specially qualied recipients are distinguished; dierences between experts in epistemological and moral contexts are highlighted. This framework then is the point of reference for claims about experts, expertise and moral testimony in Birnbacher's and Jones & Schroeter's contributions to this volume. First, Birnbacher's worries about the legitimacy of moral philosophers sitting as experts on panels, etc. are allayed in one respect and aggravated in another: there are roles and qualications open to informants about normative issues, but it is doubtful whether moral philosophers per se are up to each of them. Secondly, Jones & Schroeter's objection to Hills's claim that moral testimony cannot orient its recipient properly towards right-making reasons for acting is faulty.
Introduction
We routinely rely on experts when it comes to normative and non-normative issues. In fact, many of our beliefs about issues such as nuclear power, climate change, democracy, capitalism, communism and embryo screening are formed on the basis of the word of experts. Whether this is epistemically defensiblein the case of experts about non-normative issues, henceforth e-expertsand whether this is morally defensiblein the case of experts in the domain of norms and values, henceforth n-expertsis highly controversial. The exact reasons for these assessments are markedly dierent. In epistemology it is uncontroversial that there are e-experts and that there is a certain respect due to their testimony.
Rather, the debate is about what recipients of testimony have to do in order to make their reliance justied and whether they are capable of actually doing it. In moral philosophy, by contrast, it is controversial whether there even are n-experts and whether relying on them in our actions is morally acceptable at all. Perhaps the two debates can prot from each other: I will apply Goldman's take on the e-expert and on (factual) testimony to normative issues and use it as the point of reference for discussing Jones & Schroeter's account of reasons-transferring moral testimony and Birnbacher's account of ethics experts and ethical expertise.
A Goldman-inspired Account of E-experts and E-teachers
Goldman conceives of the concepts of expert and expertise as tightly relatedhe even tends to slide from talk about the one concept to talk about the other. He begins by acknowledging that there is a notion of expertise which refers to skills only while stressing that this is not what he has in mind: cognitive expertise and thus cognitive or intellectual experts are what he is interested in. He develops three characteristics of cognitive experts and their expertise. First, cognitive experts have more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs in their domain of expertise (Goldman calls this the E-domain) than the vast majority of people (Goldman 2001, 91) . This comparative requirement is counterbalanced by an absolute one: Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be reached, though there is great vagueness in setting this threshold. (ibid.)
Secondly, expertise includes a set of skills to deploy or exploit this fund of information to form beliefs in true answers to new questions that may be posed in the domain (ibid.). Thirdly, the E-domain contains the following two categories.
Primary questions within the E-domain are the principal questions of interest to the researchers or students of the subject-matter (ibid., 92). By contrast, secondary questions concern the existing evidence or arguments that bear on the primary questions and the assessments of the evidence made by prominent researchers (ibid.). What delineates E-domains and how do we distinguish between them? For instance, is medical science a single E-domain or should we separate between the multitude of specialities and subspecialties? This is a moot point with Goldman. I think we should take him to endorse the received divisions and subdivisions.
With the help of the distinction between primary and secondary questions
Goldman dierentiates between dierent kinds of experts. Strong experts in a given E-domain are those who have expertise in the above sense with regard to both primary and secondary question in the E-domain. Weak experts only possess expertise with regard to secondary questions. Reputational experts are those who arecorrectly or incorrectlyconsidered to be (weak or strong) experts. 1
Public and Research E-experts
The function the qualier`principal' in Goldman's delineation of primary questions is not transparent. Imagine someone is interested in the answer to the question`What is the rate with which objects fall on Mars?'. Such a question is not a principal question in science, i.e. one of the main research questions.
1 There is a wealth of further useful information in Goldman's essay, e.g. the distinction between esoteric and exoteric statements ormore importantlythe inquiry into the quality of tools available to assess whether reputational e-experts are genuine e-experts.
However, such commonplace questions might be of burning interest to a learner, layman, novice, . . . a principal question of interest to a not specially qualied individual.
So what does it take for a question to be a principal question? I think it is mistaken to read the qualier`principal' as being geared at picking out main research questions. Goldman's reason for adding`principal' is to prevent people who score high on answers to questions in the E-domain that interest people only marginally, but are atrocious when it comes to answers to questions that are of highprincipalinterest from being experts. This does not mean that main research questions do not belong to the primary questions. After all, that the interests of researchers are included makes it very likely that main research questions are also included among the primary questions. It is just that questions such as the above which happen to interest not specially qualied individuals strongly are also among the primary questions. This reading is borne out by the following cues: First, the epistemic problem which Goldman proceeds to analyse is the following: The novice/2-experts problem is whether a layperson can justiably choose one putative expert as more credible or trustworthy than the other with respect to the question at hand, and what might be the epistemic basis for such a choice. (Goldman (2001, 92) This problem is not limited to cases where the`question at hand' is a main research question. On the contrary, its most frequent occurrences are when the`question at hand' is a question the novice or layperson are interested in. That these are not limited to main research questions is obvious. Second, the examples of expert statements Goldman provides in the context of this inquiry also suggest that it is not just main research questions that count when it comes to experts: There will be an eclipse of the sun on April 22, 2130, in Santa Fe, New Mexico (ibid., 106) is not an answer to a primary research question. Yet statements of this type feature crucially in Goldman's take on how laypersons can use experts' track records to assess credibility. Third, there is a precedent in Goldman (1999, 9496) 
Research E-experts and Types of Public E-experts
Here is my proposal for a modication of Goldman's account:
• Primary questions are the questions of main interest to not specially qualied recipients in a given E-domainlaypersons.
• Secondary questions are dened as before, i.e. they concern the existing evidence or arguments that bear on the primary questions, and the assessments of the evidence made by prominent researchers (Goldman (2001, 92 ).
• Main research questions are those questions which mainly interest researchers in the given E-domain.
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With the help of the distinction between these three types of questions, we can dierentiate between four types of experts (my formulations parallel Goldman's wherever no changes are needed):
3 In addition to the overlap between primary and main research questions already mentioned, there is also overlap between secondary and main research questions. For instance, if applications of theories that are a focus of current research are needed to answer a certain primary question, then secondary questions that bear on this primary question will contain main research questions. I do not need to commit myself to the view that primary, secondary and research questions exhaust the E-domain. However, they cover everything of interest in this essay.
1. A strong public e-expert has more beliefs (or high degrees of belief ) in true answers to primary and secondary questions in a given E-domain and/or fewer beliefs in false answers to such questions than most people do (or better: than the vast majority of people do). In addition, the proportion of his true answers to these questions meets a non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment. He also has a capacity or disposition to deploy or exploit his fund of answers to these questions in order to form beliefs in true answers to new primary and secondary questions that may be posed in the E-domain.
2. In the case of the weak public e-expert, the qualities of the belief system and the capacity (or disposition) mentioned above are limited to answers to secondary questions.
3. In the case of intermediate public e-experts, the qualities of the belief system and the capacity (or disposition) mentioned above are limited to answers to primary questions.
4.
A research e-expert has more beliefs (or high degrees of belief ) in true answers to main research questions in a given E-domain and/or fewer beliefs in false answers to main research questions than most people do (or better: than the vast majority of people do). In addition, the proportion of his true answers to these questions meets a non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment. He also has a capacity or disposition to deploy or exploit his fund of answers to these questions in order to form beliefs in true answers to new main research questions that may be posed in the E-domain. We shall see who actually needs pedagogical qualications. At any rate, it seems advisable to examine whether research experts are automatically public experts
in each E-domain we consider.
We can conclude that public experts are not automatically qualied as research experts and that there are serious doubts over whether research experts are automatically qualied as public experts. At any rate, research experts serve a dierent epistemic role than public experts in exchanges between specially qualied senders and ordinary recipients. In this context, it is important to see that the role of expert is not the only role senders can assume in such exchanges.
Informants and Their Epistemic Roles
In his inuential Goldman (1999) , Goldman distinguishes the two social epistemic sources of testimony and of monological argumentation. In both cases a recipient makes use of the words of others to form beliefs. The crucial dierence lies in the nature of these words. In monological argumentation, the speaker's utterance might take the form`P; and my evidence or reasons for P are R1, . . . , Rn'; or, to invert the order`R1, . . . , Rn, therefore (probably) P' (ibid., 130).
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By contrast, in the case of testimony, the sender simply utters`P'without adding his reasons.
6 Which of these sources will be used by the expert in typical exchanges between him and not specially qualied recipients? Both variants are possible, but the epistemic role assumed in each is dierent.
Consider the case of testimony and argumentation of limited complexity and length rst. The resulting beliefs of the recipient are justied in a way that heavily depends on the authority of the expert sender. Hills (2009, 98106, esp. 101104 ) cannot be attained this way.
The roles in more complex argumentations are markedly dierent. The sender does not simply testify that this or that is so, but he gives reasons for his assessment. Resulting beliefs of recipients areat least in the long runjustied in a way that no longer depends on the authority of the expert sender at all. The 5 There are two further subtypes of the social epistemic source of argumentation: dialogical argumentation and debate. In dialogical argumentation, two or more speakers discourse with one another, taking opposite sides of the issues over the truth of the conclusion. In a debate, arguers address a separate audience, not just one another (Goldman 1999, 131) .
6 In the passage just discussed, Goldman seems to limit the propositions testied to to simple reports of observations (ibid., 130). However, this does not t what he says elsewhere.
For instance, one of his examples for testimonies is that a reporter asserts, for instance, that (he saw) a certain kind of particle pass through a cloud chamber (ibid., 123)which is certainly not simple observation and possibly not observation at all. Moreover, the dierent sorts of competence a reliable sender needs in dierent kinds of testimonies include inferential skills and memory skills (ibid.). All this counts against understanding`observation' in a restrictive sense. At any rate, if testimony is delineated without any restrictions as to the subject matter of`P', then argumentation and testimony probably exhaust (or nearly so) the epistemically relevant kind of discoursewhich is what is needed here.
reason for this is simple: the more complex the argumentation is, i.e. the more information about support-relations, reasons for reasons, etc. it contains, the more the belief system of a diligently learning recipient looks like the sender's belief system in the relevant respect. In any case, the dependence on the authority of the sender is less marked, especially once the senders also clarify the support relations between the conclusion and the reasons for it. When we are, once again, pressed to give a name to the dierent epistemic roles, teacher and learner are best, and the whole communicative situation can be dubbed teacher-learner exchange. When we as learners consult someone as a teacher, we do not seek to forego eorts; rather, we seek instructions on how to go about in our eort to attain true belief, justied true belief or knowledge. In such an exchange, the recipient can attain knowledge that, knowledge why and understanding why provided the sender is reliable, the recipient is diligent and the argumentation is suitably complex.
Hence, specially qualied sendersinformants can be assigned two dierent roles: teachers and experts. What are the qualications they need to full these roles? The notions of strong, intermediate and weak, public e-expert t in nicely with the qualications needed to full one's epistemic role as expert.
But what are the qualications that enable someone to full one's role as a teacher? What are (public) e-teachers? 9 Note that the role of the teacher is not just to provide answers to primary and/or secondary questions but to provide additional explanations that are actually understood by the learner: a teacher has to be able to explainfor instancewhy this or that secondary question is relevant to the primary question the learner is interested in, why this or that proposition answers the given primary questions. Hence, the expertise necessary for e-teachers would denitely include pedagogical or didactical skills and knowledge. This is an additional qualication of e-teachers compared to e-experts. However, this seems to be the only dierence. The other skills and expertise can be dened analogously as in weak, intermediate and strong public e-experts. Hence, the following seems true:
• In order to have the role of expert in expert-learner exchanges, one has to be a reputational public e-expert or reputational e-teacher.
• In order to full one's role as an expert in expert-layman exchanges, one has to be an e-expert or e-teacherin most cases. Depending on the layman's questions, one may turn out to be also a research e-expert.
• In order to have the role of teacher in teacher-learner exchanges, one has to be a reputational e-teacher.
• In order to full one's role as a teacher in teacher-learner exchanges, one has to be an e-teacherin most cases. Depending on the learner's questions, one may turn out to be also a research e-expert.
9 I won't discuss whether there are research e-teachers. Instead, I only cover public eteachers and hence drop the qualier`public'.
• Public e-experts can have the role of a teacher, but they are not overly well qualied for this role. I take prototypical primary moral questions to be concerned with a moral quandary laypersons face or are interested inquestions like Is abortion wrong?, Is it just that CEOs earn so much more than ordinary employees? or Is it right to eat meat?. Experts answer such questions by making public their moral 10 Two explanations are in order. First, the distinction between testimony and argumentation is not watertight. If the testimonial situation is interactive so that the recipient of testimony can pose questions, he may inquire after reasons: in this case there may be a sequence of testimonies which also provide reasons, reasons for reasons, etc. I would classify the resulting sequence of statements as an argumentation. Second, the sender can perhaps be assigned yet further epistemic roles. E.g., Hills points out that a sender's utterance can be treated as moral advice. In this case, the recipient does not simply rely on the moral judgement expressed in the utterance, but he gains awareness of another point of view, the interests of others, and he see[s] more clearly. So, he uses the sender's words to gain genuine moral understanding (Hills 2009, 123) . However, I take the epistemic role of advisor to be included in the epistemic role of teacher. judgement of the matter at hand. Such answers do not have a truth value, since I here adopt Birnbacher's assumption that moral judgements are not truth-apt.
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Ifas is plausiblewe conceive of evidence in truth-linked terms, 12 it does not make sense to speak of evidence that bears on primary moral questions. To an extent, this interferes with Goldman's notion of secondary questions which concern the existing evidence and the arguments that bear on the primary questions (Goldman 2001, 92) . However, it is unproblematic to say that secondary moral questions concern the arguments that bear on the primary questions.
Prototypical secondary moral questions are hence questions such as What are Singer's arguments against eating meat? or What would theory X or philosopher Y have to say about the dilemma at hand?. Here, n-experts do not voice their moral judgement about ethical matters; rather, they inform laypersons what others have had to say about themthey answer exegetic questions. In addition, they also answer factual questions, since such answers are also relevant, as Singer points out:
I may, for instance, be wondering whether it is right to eat meat.
I would have a better chance of reaching the right decision, or at least, a soundly based decision, if I knew a number of facts about the capacities of animals for suering, and about the methods of rearing and slaughtering animals now being used. (Singer 2006, 188) By contrast, prototypical main research questions deal with meta-ethical issues or questions about foundations. Hence, main research questions include, for instance, What shape should a consequentialist ethical theory take?, Should one adopt a consequentialist or deontological ethical theory?, Are slippery slope arguments good arguments?, or Are moral judgements truth-apt?
Once we leave the prototypical cases, we note that the boundaries between main research questions and primary and secondary moral questions are not clear-cut. As an illustration, let us assume that an expert bases his moral judgement answering the question whether abortion is wrong on a slippery slope argument. In this case, the research question Are slippery slope arguments good arguments? would also be a secondary moral question, since an answer to this question bears on the expert's answer to the primary moral question. His answer might also hinge on the particular moral theory he endorses so that questions about that theory or normative theories in generale.g. Should one adopt a consequentialist or deontological ethical theory? turn out to be secondary moral questions. Additionally, a lay audience may have one or the other main research questions as one of their main questions of interest or become interested in the 11 Why is Birnbacher's assumption adopted if this results in diculties? Given that I use my application as a point of reference for assessing his essay, it would not be advisable to drop crucial assumptions. Hence, a defence of this controversial claim is uncalled for (though I have to admit I agree with it). Moreover, if moral judgements turn out to be truth-apt after all, the account of n-experts and their expertise I develop by applying Goldman will be strengthened anyway.
12 E.g. Achinstein 1978. Mind you, if it were possible to speak of evidence in cases where the hypothesis supported is not truth-apt, this would be even better for the application. However, it does not rest on this being possible. exegesis of this or that philosophical text. These are all intricacies that have already been pointed out with the analogous distinctions in E-domains and which make it hard to put forward general claims about whether public experts are research experts and vice versa. It would be futile to try and solve this issue here.
Instead, I will only point out the following: in general, just as with e-experts, it is not automatically the case that research n-experts are public n-experts (and vice versa). That the knowledge and skills of research n-experts are such that they automatically make them public n-experts needs argumentative support presumably in each N-domain. However, in the N-domains under the heading of applied ethics the main research questions seem to be virtually co-extensive with primary moral questions. Someone who is a research n-expert here is also a public expert (and vice versa).
3.1 Are There N-experts?
In the above stages of the applications I have largely set aside a major complication for extrapolating what makes for an e-expert to n-experts: Goldman's denition of e-experts is truth-linked, but moral propositions are not truth-apt.
It is obvious that this is dangerous for the requirements concerning the absolute and comparative amounts of true and false beliefs. However, the skills element is also in danger, since skills have been dened in truth-linked terms.
13 So is there such a thing as an n-expert? Let us rst examine how far a veritistic conception of n-experts can take us and then briey point out problems of a natural modication.
The prospect for a veritistic conception of n-experts depends on whether there are answers to primary or secondary moral questions that are truth-apt. 14 In what follows, I focus on the three types of public n-experts and disregard research n-experts.
15 I disregard that there are positions in literary theory which hamper identifying the conditions for correct interpretation. merits of a single theory). This does not imply that an answer to such questions does not have a truth value, but at any rate it seems that it is not accessible to experts.
So it seems that answers to prototypical primary moral questions are nottruth apt, while answers to prototypical secondary moral questions are. Main research questions turn out to be a mixed bag. Once we distance ourselves from the prototypical cases, the picture changes: primary moral questions remain largely not truth-apt, the occasional exegetic or factual questions notwithstanding. The case of secondary moral questions depends on the extent to which they are swamped by meta-ethical questions or the questions about foundations among the main research questions. It appears that this is a controversial issue.
Birnbacher reports that
[q]uite a number of philosophical ethical advisors make an attempt to solve practical problems in a pragmatic spirit, leaving aside the age-old debates about foundations and starting not from controversial basic principles but from axiomata media on a medium level of generality for which consensus is easier to achieve. (Birnbacher, 243) The answers such theorists give to primary moral questions do not carry much ballast in terms of secondary moral questions that bear on them. However, Birnbacher is opposed to their approach. I do not want to delve into this issue, but only highlight the options available. If secondary moral questions turn out to consist in the prototypical cases mentioned above, then answers to such questions are truth-apt and there are weak n-experts. If secondary moral questions turn out to comprise also meta-ethical main research questions or main research questions about foundations, there are two options: if answers to these main research questions are truth-apt after all and n-experts can assess their truth value, there still are weak n-experts. If answers to these questions turn out not to be truth-apt or n-experts cannot assess their truth value, weak n-experts seem endangered. However, if the prototypical secondary moral questions continue to comprise a healthy portion of secondary moral questions, it might still make sense to speak of weak n-experts.
To sum up: there are no strong and intermediate n-experts if moral judgements are not truth-apt, but there is a chance that there are weak n-experts.
Moreover, there is a precedent for evaluating reliance on their answers to prototypical secondary moral questions: since their answers are truth-apt despite bearing on normative issues, they are similar to factual testimony. It is, therefore, tempting to extend the analysis of reliance on (factual) testimony in epistemology to testimony about secondary moral questions. Almost all epistemologists agree that a certain respect is due to testimony; Still, it is not a welcome result that there are no strong and intermediate n-experts and that weak n-experts are an endangered species. What can we do about it? There are at least three obvious solutions: First, one might question the claim that moral judgements are not truth-apt. While we are at it, we might also contend that answers to meta-ethical questions and questions about foundations are also truth-apt, thus also securing that there are strong n-experts and allaying the lingering doubts about weak n-experts. Secondly, we might heroically bite the bullet and say that there are no strong and no intermediate n-experts. Prima facie, the most attractive solution is to modify the truth-linked elements of Goldman's denitions of expertise and expertthe conditions about the expert's belief system and his skills.
Perspectives of a Non-veritistic Account
A straightforward replacement would be the following: the n-expert's belief system with respect to the given N-domain(s) is distinguished by the greater amount of soundly supported beliefs and by reaching a non-comparative threshold of justicatory attainment. His special capacity or disposition consists in his being able to deploy or exploit his fund of aforesaid beliefs to form soundly supported beliefs in answers to new questions that may be posed in N-domains. Both formulations parallel Goldman's veritistic proposals and can be adapted to the dierent types of n-experts. Intuitive as this candidate is, three obstacles not faced by a veritistic conception must be overcome.
First, it must be specied what it takes for a moral belief to be soundly supported in non-veritistic terms. There is no consensus among the various moral theorists as to what makes a moral judgement soundly supported. I would not wish to be`refereeing' a discussion on that matter between, for instance, J. L. Mackie, a hard-nosed deontologist and a religious leader who advocates a theistic ethics on the basis on whatever religious tract he adheres to. An advocate of the idea that n-experts are marked by the sound support of their beliefs in the N-domains has to take up and defend a position in this debate.
It might be objected that there are dierent`schools' in the sciences, which seems to create a disagreement about e-experts similar to that about sound support. However, it is doubtful that such debates between scientic schools have much impact on who counts as e-expert in a veritistic conception of it.
Recall that a lot of the primary questions public e-experts answer are distinctly mundane. Do the debates between the schools really extend to such questions? Take, for instance, Goldman's example about the solar eclipse in Santa Fé.
It is implausible that the big debates in the scientic schools impact on such answers. By contrast, debates between the dierent schools in ethics impact right at the heart of primary moral questions. The previously mentioned examples illustrate this point: dierent schoolse.g. consequentialist and religious (and moral) leadersanswer the questions of whether abortion is wrong or eating meat is defensible dierently, and they support their answers in fundamentally dierent ways! This is an obstacle to the sound-support conception of n-experts not faced by veritistic conceptions of e-experts.
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Secondly, the value of soundly supported belief as opposed to plain belief must be claried if the n-experts beliefs are superior to those of laypersons on the grounds of their being soundly supported. The problem is that we cannot fall back on truth in order to argue for the value of soundly supported beliefs. In epistemology, there is an age-old debate whether having a justication for one's beliefs is merely instrumentally valuable as a means to attain the real goaltrue beliefs.
18 Prominent epistemologists have denied that justication has any value other than that.
19 If this position were extended to the case of the sound support for beliefs in N-domains, the n-experts beliefs would no longer be superior. Why should this be unacceptable? Of course, it is possible to argue that sound support is of value for some reason other than that it is instrumental to attaining truth.
But this means that we have to position ourselves in a complicated debate yet again. In the case of a veritistic denition of experts, there is no need to do so: all that is needed to argue that the experts' beliefs are superior and should be relied on is the uncontroversial value of truth. judgement. This is easy in the favourable scenario just sketched: blind trust would be a reliable mechanism for forming moral beliefs. However, once less favourable reporting practices are admitted at least as relevant alternatives, a reliable mechanism would have to be suciently discriminatory. It is doubtful that any actually used mechanism satises this condition, which casts doubt on going external to argue that testimonial moral beliefs actually have sound support. Note that the situation is dierent in the case of less favourable reporting practices of e-experts. True, if even the best mechanism available in this case is not suciently discriminatory between trustworthy and untrustworthy reputational e-experts, then the beliefs laymen end up with are not soundly supported either, and many of them will be false. Still, as long as this mechanism will generate less false and more true beliefs in answers to primary and secondary questions than the layman's trying for himself, there will be a (very weak) case for using this mechanism. The layman prots from relying on the expert insofar as he is slightly better o than if he relied on his own devices. Such a scenario is quite plausible. makes for these qualications in a skill-account are skills. Now, Birnbacher's skill-account suers from the above problems just as much as the non-veritistic account of n-experts just presented. In both cases it is argued that what makes strong n-experts' answers to primary and secondary moral questions that are not truth-apt valuable is the sound argumentative support they possess for these answers, and it is this very notion of sound support and the idea that it is valuable that have run into problems. If Birnbacher's account has advantages over the account just presented, it must be for other reasons.
Birnbacher on Ethics Experts
Birnbacher answers the question of how experts in normative issues can be de- 22 Since he also claims that the skill behind arguments for one's judgements and hence behind one's ability to put forward a coherent justication is clear thinking (241), it seems warranted to take him to claim that the expert's expertise is using the capacity to think clearlyand not just having the capacity, since he seems to attribute it to any reasonably intelligent person (241).
23 Second, he has it that ethical expertise concerns the correctness of which judgements follow from what premises (242).
Birnbacher accounts of professional experience in terms of the eect it and ethical expertise have on the ethics expert's judgements and arguments: her judgements are based on arguments; these arguments are more explicit and elaborated, and they prot from the expert's having a more dierentiated and nuanced view of complex cases (241). He includes information as to the nature of practitioners' experience, but stays silent on the ethics expert's professional experience.
In addition, Birnbacher also claims that the following is expected from moral philosophers: 21 A moral expert knows which norms and values are the correct ones, in a sense of`correct' by which correctness is understood as something more ambitious than simple conformity with widely accepted standards (240). Birnbacher argues that it is doubtful that there is such a sense of`correct' with regard to norms and judgements; hence, this category is empty. Probably this is also the reason why he does not say what moral expertise would consist in if it existed. At rst glance, these expectations need not have anything to do with ethics experts. After all, Birnbacher explains the role of ethical expertise in dening the concept of ethics expert in a way that suggests that having ethical expertise alone is necessary and sucient. On the other hand, when it comes to actually sketching the qualications of ethics experts, having ethical expertise seems to be one of several conditions someone has to satisfy in order to be an ethics expert.
Moreover, the sentences immediately preceding and following these expectations strongly suggest that there is a connection to the qualications of ethics experts (240).
Birnbacher's account of ethical and moral experts and their expertise could have been developed with two distinct aims in mind. On the one hand, it could be read as a rough and ready sketch of abilities, skills, knowledge, etc. people sitting on panels as n-experts should have. As such it might be unproblematic. On the other hand, it could be read as an analysis of n-experts and their expertise. As such it is not unproblematic at all. There is evidence for both readings in the text.
What are the problems with reading the account as an analysis of n-experts and their expertise? The main reason is that the Goldman-inspired analysis is better suited to answering questions such as whether there can be expertise and experts in normative domains or whether there is warrant for people serving as n-informants on panels, etc.the very questions Birnbacher addresses. Why is this? The Goldman-inspired account helps us be precise about which general kinds of n-experts we are concerned withpublic or research n-expertsand about which kinds of questions we expect them to answersecondary and/or primary. Moreover, it helps us be precise about which epistemic roles we want to assign to n-informants on panelsexperts or teachersand, consequently, pinpoint how they need to be qualied to full these roles. It is evident that all this is helpful for answering the above questions. is doubtful that the consensus extends to all the properties included in his expectations. The problem is that he does not separate research and public n-experts.
The result is that, on the one hand, the properties mentioned oscillate between the one and the other kind of expertwith a bias towards public n-experts because this is the kind of expert relevant to Birnbacher's focus on the experts' role as a panellist, committee member, etc. On the other hand, when talking about moral philosophers he is ostensibly dealing with research n-experts, as he himself acknowledges when he reports the typical question moral philosophers ask colleagues who specialise in applied ethics: The typical question specialist philosophers ask an applied moral philosopher is thus`Do you do any real philosophy apart from this?' (247) The third item on the above list is a case in point: why are moral philosophers expected to have experience of typical moral conicts in given decision-making 24 Further misgivings concern Birnbacher's take on moral peer disagreement. He claims that two experts with the same ethical expertise can disagree while two experts with the same moral expertise could notif it existed. We should add: the moral and the ethics experts possess the same information about the case, the same knowledge about ethical systems and have perhaps even shared and discussed their stocks of information. This way the structure of the case becomes analogous to what epistemologists discuss under the heading of peer disagreement.
Still, Birnbacher's claim remains controversial: there are many epistemologists who claim that epistemic peers can have reasonable disagreement, i.e. the peers can be justied in dierent assessments of the same phenomenon given the same evidence and cognitive abilities (e.g. : Kelly 2011 or Rosen 2001 . Hence, it is not remarkable that two ethics experts can disagree. Moreover, the few things Birnbacher says about moral experts suggest that moral expertise would belong to the same category of expertise as the one pertinent to the epistemologists' debate about peer disagreement: expertise in domains about which there are truth-apt propositions.
Hence, it is not obvious that moral experts could not have peer disagreements.
situations? Imagine that a moral philosopher specialises on research questions such as Should one adopt a consequentialist or deontological ethical theory? or Are moral judgements truth-apt?. Is this moral philosopher who is a research n-expert in such N-domains really expected to have experience of typical moral conicts in given decision-making situations? This expectation is more plausible for public n-experts. Of course, it is possible that in many N-domains research experts are also public experts. I merely want to point out the following. First, this claim needs argumentative support and cannot be simply built into properties of what are clearly (predominantly) research n-experts. Second, intuitively, it is not particularly likely that research n-experts are always also public n-experts: primary moral questions are just not questions about the epistemic status of moral judgements, about whether to adhere to a consequentialist or deontological model of normative theory, etc. As has already been pointed out, the only N-domains in which it is likely that research n-experts are also public n-experts are those under the heading of applied ethics.
There is a further problem with Birnbacher's list of expectations, which becomes apparent in the fourth expectation mentioned above: why is empathy with other viewpoints required and why is distancing oneself from one's own moral position? After all, the public n-expert can provide all the information required even if he is not empathetic and still thinks that his position is best; surely, research n-experts do not count empathy and distancing among their distinguishing capacities. Is this expected from moral philosophers? Insisting on teaching capacities is also problematic. To be sure, it is helpful to have someone sitting on a panel who is capable of lecturing on the moral intricacies of e.g. choice options the panel is currently discussing. Still, as the discussion above has shown this is required of an n-teacher and not of an n-expert. Is the former what Birnbacher actually has in mind? The problem is that Birnbacher does not dierentiate between n-experts and n-teachers, on the one hand, and the epistemic roles of experts and teachers, on the other. If the ethics expert is chiey concerned with testifying, then he assumes the role of expert; and in order to full his role, he should be an n-expert (of the weak, intermediate or strong kind, depending on which kind of moral question his testimony answers).
It is doubtful that empathy and distancing are required. However, if the ethics expert takes up the role of a teachere.g. he aids people in evaluating their own moral considerations on their own, then in order to full it, he should be an n-teacher. Empathy and distancing are more plausible as qualications for n-teachers than for n-experts (though this is not entirely convincing either).
Birnbacher does not squarely make up his mind about, and then keep his eye on, the dierent kinds of epistemic roles n-informants can have and the dierent qualications they have to possess to full these roles.
Jones & Schroeter on Reasons-transferring Moral Testimony
Probably the most damaging among the aforementioned obstacles to centring the notion of n-experts on the concept of sound support is the following: even in an expert-layman exchange where the reputational n-expert is a genuine expert and sincere, it is not the case that a layman prots from relying on him. Jones & Schroeter discuss a particular variant of this objectionHills's argument to the conclusion that agents who Φ on the basis of moral testimony are not Φ- While such testimony does not provide independent orientation towards these reasons, it provides all the material a recipient who is concerned to do the right thing needs to be oriented towards these reasons in such a way that he Φ-s for the right reasons (provided the reasons transferred are indeed right-making).
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The third step is the claim that a lot of moral testimony is reasons-transferring.
What Is Moral Testimony?
It is hard to get a grip on what is meant by the concept of testimony in epistemology. It seems justied to concur with Kusch: There is no widespread agreement among epistemologists on how best to delimit the category of testimony. (Kusch 2002, 14) Can anything be said about reasons-transferring testimony then? Epistemologists can denitely agree on one thing: none of them discuss cases in which the testimony that p also contains reason for p. The multitude of divergent notions notwithstanding, this is a consideration that counts against
Jones & Schroeter's idea. Moreover, it is pointless to simply object that statements of the above general form should or should not be classied as testimony.
25`Φ ' is a placeholder for a verb, phrasal verb, etc.
26`F ' is a placeholder for an adjective that expresses a moral evaluation of Φ-ing, e.g. morally right',`just'; and`p' expresses (the sender's attempt at) a reason why Φ-ing is F.
Two explanations are in order. First, there are complications for the general scheme. E.g., F' is also a placeholder for evaluative adjectives such as wrong and forbidden, which causes problems when I speak of reasons for Φ-ing. However, accounting for such issues would merely render the scheme cumbersome. Second, reasons-giving testimony might take dierent forms, e.g.: P, therefore it is F to Φ-ing. I take such dierences to be unimportant, and I take Jones & Schroeter's notion to include such alternative forms.
27 Much can go wrong in, rst, receiving, secondly, deriving beliefs about the moral quality of Φ-ing and the reasons for this from it and, thirdly, Φ-ing on the basis of these beliefs. I will disregard such complications.
Given certain aims, all sorts of denitions might be advisable. Therefore, the general aims pursued have to be taken into account when evaluating a particu- claim that the sender somehow transfers his reasons to the recipient so that the recipient is oriented towards them in a way that he is Φ-ing for the right-making reasons. In eect, the recipient is thus raised to the same`level' with regard to Φ-ing as the sender who has come up with the evaluation and the reasons for it himself. If this is correct, Jones & Schroeter come to an important result:
while the sender cannot enable the recipient to Φ for right-making reasons by testifying that Φ-ing is F, he can do so by arguing that Φ-ing is F because p.
The predicament is that there is one robust intuition suggesting that Jones & Schroeter's claim is correct and another equally robust intuition suggesting it is not. On the one hand, the recipient of a monological argumentation Φ-ing is F because p passes one test for being properly oriented towards the reasons why Φ-ing is F. Whenever he is asked to provide a reason, he can readily provide it:
p. On the other hand, he does not pass two dierent tests: whenever he is asked either why p or why p supports Φ-ing is F, he can only refer the interlocutor to the sender. However, these are simple questions about p and the support relation between p and the moral judgement that Φ-ing is F. Can someone who has to refer to the sender in such cases be credited with being properly oriented towards p, let alone with Φ-ing for the right-making reasons? Jones & Schroeter agree with Hills that simply answering the question why Φ-ing is F by informing the interlocutor that one has been told so is not enoughotherwise, they could have attacked Hills without having to take recourse to reasons-transferring testimony.
Why should such an answer suddenly be acceptable?
Jones & Schroeter could argue that a modied variant of this particular piece of argumentation does the job: Φ-ing is F because of p and p supports Φ-ing is F because of q. 29 But this response only pushes the problem back one level. In this case, the recipient is dumbfounded by the question why q supports the claim that p supports Φ-ing is F. Still, it is doubtful whether each further expansion of the argumentation can be countered in this way. While the above considerations make it clear that the basic case does not do the job, somewhere down the line of additions to the original argumentation it becomes plausible that the recipient is properly oriented towards the reasons for the judgement that Φ-ing is Fprovided the sender is himself properly oriented towards them. Why is this? Recall that if the argumentation is suitably complex and the recipient is diligently learning, the recipient's belief system becomes similar to that of the sender. If this is right, then, at some stage, the recipient no longer needs to refer to the sender as the reason for his moral judgement that Φ-ing is F, and this is what is needed to safeguard the claim that the recipient can be enabled to Φ for right-making reasons by a sender's argumentation against objections of the above kind.
What precisely have Jones & Schroeter shown? Recall what has been said earlier about n-experts, n-teachers and the epistemic roles of expert and teachers:
It seems to me that the sender in this exchange has successfully served as a teacher. He has taught the reasons of why Φ-ing is F, the reasons why these are reasons, the reasons why these reasons are reasons, . . . and thus succeeded in 29 For the sake of simplicity I focus on one of the two dierent questions the recipient fails to answer.
properly orienting his learners towards right-making reasons for Φ-ing. Given that such exchanges have to be fairly complex to achieve proper orientation, it seems necessary that the sender also possesses pedagogical and didactical skills and knowledge. Thus, he is an n-teacher and has the role of a teacher. Jones & Schroeter have hence not succeeded in proving that n-experts in their role as experts can orient laymen properly towards right-making reasons for Φ-ing.
Instead, they have merely succeeded in showing that n-teachers in their role as teachers can properly orient their learners towards right-making reasons for Φ-ing. Epistemically, this result is unremarkable. 30
Concluding Remarks
Identifying the qualications needed for n-informants to not specially qualied recipients and clarifying their role has turned out to be an extraordinarily complicated task. We have to decide, rst, whether we wish them to have the epistemic role of expert or teacher and, secondly, what qualications they need to have. If
we want them to have the role of experts, we have to decide whether they need to be only public experts or if they have to be research experts as well to full their role. This depends on whether we want them to be able to answer primary or secondary moral questions and on the amount of main research questions among them. Hence, it may be the case that n-informants qualied as weak, intermediate or strong n-experts (or the analogous types of n-teachers) are sucient. However, if there are a lot of main research questions among the primary or secondary moral questions, n-informants are research n-experts as well (even if they have the role of a teacher). Luckily, solving these issues was not my aim, but rather to sketch a framework that helps us pose them. Birnbacher's, Jones & Schroeter's and Goldman's essays were invaluable here.
There are even silver linings for some of the obstacles concerning n-informants and especially n-experts. There is a real chance that there are weak n-experts and n-teachers even if they are conceived of veritistically(and corresponding epistemic roles) at least with regard to the truth-apt secondary moral questions.
What is more, weak n-experts in the epistemic role of experts can generate justied testimonial belief and testimonial knowledge. N-teachers, in their role of teachers, can even make use of the epistemic source of argumentation to transfer the sound support they may have for their answers to primary moral questions dealing with moral judgements to their learners so that these learners could act for right-making reasons. This ability of n-teachers may attenuate the problem of how not specially qualied recipients can prot from n-informants if the dierence between them only consists in the sound support they have for their beliefs. However, there are obstacles with regard to the meaning of sound support and its value. Hence, the transfer of right-making reasons and the very 30 Additionally, the causal history of the relevant beliefs in the sender and his learner is dierent (if the teacher has not been taught in turn). Hence, if it is not the case that all that matters for being properly oriented towards right-making reasons are the internal states of the agent, then the dierence between teacher and learner persists.
